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Before police in riot gear fired rounds of tear gas at unarmed protesterson September 28, few could have expected that the siege of the gov-ernment headquarters would turn the scripted Occupy Central (zhan-
ling zhonghuan 佔領中環) into Hong Kong’s biggest and most unprecedented
pro-democracy movement amidst its electoral reforms. (1) In the next two-
and-a-half months, protesters of what became the Umbrella Movement
(yusan yundong 雨傘運動) (2) would occupy major roads in the city’s busiest
districts, set up tents, stock up supplies, and protect their territories with
makeshift barricades, sometimes with human chains, to stop police incursion
and opposing groups. Across the encampments, they would press on for a
focused goal – “genuine universal suffrage” (zhen puxuan 真普選) for election
of their Chief Executive, the city’s top leader – until police officers cleared
the last occupied site on December 15. This article assesses the implications
of the Umbrella Movement as it drew to a close. It explains how the move-
ment morphed from the Occupy Central movement, and reviews the con-
troversy raised over the city’s rule of law and constitutional relations with
mainland China. Despite having amplified democracy supporters’ yearnings
for universal suffrage, the movement, in which no compromise was offered
by Beijing and the Hong Kong government, will likely deepen social cleavages
and send the city toward an uncertain future.
From Occupy Central to the Umbrella
Movement
The Umbrella Movement was set against a protracted debate over the elec-
toral reform of the city’s Chief Executive election. According to the National
People’s Congress ruling in 2007, Hong Kong may finally introduce universal
suffrage for the election of the fifth Chief Executive in 2017 – after it was
twice denied by Beijing for its 2007 and 2012 elections. (3) If universal suffrage
is implemented in 2017, Chief Executive candidates would be elected by a
popular vote instead of being selected by an election committee – but they
must be selected by a nominating committee to ensure that the elected
leader would not oppose the central government and that he/she would
“love the country and love Hong Kong” (aiguo aigang 愛國愛港), a require-
ment set out by numerous Chinese officials. In addition, Hong Kong’s Basic
Law requires this nominating committee to be “broadly representative” and
to operate “in accordance with democratic procedures,” but it does not
clearly outline the composition of the committee or the nomination proce-
dure. (4)
The nomination process soon became the focal point of contention.
Across the pro-democracy camp, there were widespread concerns that the
nomination process will act as a safety valve to screen out candidates re-
garded unfavourably by Beijing. Fearing that the election might turn out to
be “fake universal suffrage” (jia puxuan 假普選), democracy supporters ar-
gued that they have not only the right to be elected but also the right to
be nominated, and thus they deserve a more democratic and inclusive nom-
ination process. (5) Many insisted on the introduction of civic nomination
(gongmin timing 公民提名), a mechanism that would allow the public to
bypass the nominating committee and directly nominate Chief Executive
candidates, but which has been rejected by the government as a contra-
vention of the Basic Law. (6) Some would accept a more democratically-
formed nominating committee, as long as there was reform on its
composition and/or a reasonably lower nomination threshold.
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1. All links in the footnotes were accessed on 5 January 2015.
2. Foreign media originally coined the term “Umbrella Revolution” because of protesters’ use of um-
brellas to defend themselves against police incursion. The term quickly became a popular hashtag
across the Internet. But OCLP organizers and local scholars rejected the name, arguing that “rev-
olution” carries the connotation of overthrowing the government, which was not the intention
of the mass protest, and might prompt Beijing to over-react. The term “Umbrella Movement,”
they argue, would be a more neutral way to characterise the Occupy protest. See, for example,
Chris Yeung, “Don’t Call Hong Kong’s Protests an ‘Umbrella Revolution’,” The Atlantic, 8 October
2014, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/dont-call-hong-
kongs-protests-an-umbrella-revolution/381231/.
3. Josh Noble, “Hong Kong sets in motion overhaul of electoral system,” Financial Times, 15 July
2014, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d87a0b04-0bf2-11e4-9080-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz3NwNAA0IC; “Full text of NPC decision on Hong Kong’s constitutional development,”
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress, 29 December 2007.
4. Article 45 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law states: “The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be ap-
pointed by the Central People’s Government. The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall
be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the se-
lection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” See http://www.basiclaw
.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html.
5. See a summary of different electoral proposals on the 2017 CE election at http://www.ictls.com/
php/wp2/?p=8778.
6. “Civic nomination not a must for democracy,” Hong Kong Information Service Department, 24
October 2014, available at http://www.news.gov.hk/en/categories/admin/html/2014/
10/20141024_133803.shtml.  
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The idea of Occupy Central was floated amidst the debate. In early 2013,
law professor Benny Tai Yiu-ting sketched the early vision of Occupy Central
in a series of newspaper articles and interviews. (7) Tai proposed a large-scale
civil disobedience (gongmin kangming 公民抗命) movement in which par-
ticipants would block traffic to petition for universal suffrage in the CE elec-
tion that would comply with “international standards.” (8) According to its
final plan, protesters would stage a peaceful sit-in on a major road in Cen-
tral, Hong Kong’s financial heart, for two to three days until their orderly
removal and arrest by the police – hence the name “Occupy Central with
Love and Peace” (OCLP, rang ai yu heping zhanling zhonghuan 讓愛與和平
佔領中環) to mark the rational and non-violent nature of civil disobedience.
Tai’s proposal was at first welcomed by democracy supporters for its spirit
and novelty, only to gain lukewarm support after it was criticised for being
too radical and impractical on the one hand, and too docile, self-limiting,
and distant from the youth on the other. (9)
On 31 August 2014, the National People’s Congress issued a “decision”
that set out further guidelines for the 2017 CE election. (10) According to the
“decision,” the nominating committee must be formed “in accordance with”
the existing 1,200-strong four-sector election committee, which had been
criticised for over-representing the interests of Beijing and the business sec-
tor. In addition, the new committee will only nominate two to three can-
didates for the final runoff, each of whom must secure support from more
than half of the nominating committee members – four times the existing
one-eighth threshold. The NPC decision gave new impetus to the waning
Occupy Central movement and escalated tensions as pro-democracy sup-
porters saw the decision as a blatant denial of “genuine universal suffrage,”
although the government urged lawmakers to accept the current package,
or to “pocket what they have” (daizhu xian 袋住先). On September 22,
Scholarism (xuemin sichao 學民思潮) and the Hong Kong Federation of Stu-
dents (xuelian 學聯) – two civic groups formed by high school and university
students, respectively – launched a weeklong class boycott at the Tamar
government headquarters to demand the withdrawal of the NPC decision.
It was also intended as an informal prelude to OCLP, which was anticipated
to begin on the 1 October National Day. (11)
However, two spontaneous events turned the scripted movement into an
improvised mass protest that surpassed imagination. The first was the at-
tempt to “recapture Civic Square” (chongduo gongmin guangchang 重奪公
民廣場), the government office’s forecourt, which was blocked off by fences
after the anti-national education movement (fanguojiao yundong 反國教
運動) was staged in 2012. On the night of 26 September, a group of stu-
dents climbed over the metal fences and stormed the empty forecourt,
claiming that the space belonged to the public. The students were swiftly
surrounded and arrested by the police, but the move dramatically backfired.
The next day, thousands of angry protesters swamped the government
headquarters shouting for the release of the arrested student leaders along
with slogans for genuine universal suffrage. The unexpected mobilisation
around the government offices motivated OCLP leaders to launch the
movement ahead of its proposed schedule, and also at a different location
– Admiralty instead of Central. 
But what turned OCLP into the Umbrella Movement was a more disturbing
event on September 28. As protesters flooded the roads outside the govern-
ment headquarters as a result of the police blockade, police officers in riot
gear fired 87 canisters of tear gas in an attempt to dispel protesters. Images
of protesters wearing mask and goggles while hiding behind umbrellas to
protect themselves against tear gas and pepper spray were broadcasted on
TV and spread rapidly on social media, prompting more angry crowds to take
to the streets. (12) Within hours, protesters armed with goggles, facemasks,
and umbrellas inundated Admiralty. Some even extended the “battlefront”
to Causeway Bay and Mong Kok – the city’s two main shopping districts –
where thousands of protesters launched sit-ins on the main roads.
What became of the original Occupy Central movement was an improvised
79-day occupation of Admiralty, Causeway Bay, and Mong Kok, jointly led by
the Hong Kong Federation of Students, Scholarism, and OCLP. Each occupied
district developed its own characteristics: Admiralty for its distinct middle-
class character with strong student and civic group involvement, Mong Kok
for its grassroots and triad involvement, and Causeway Bay for its popularity
with tourists. All of them became self-sufficient communities that protesters
referred to as “villages” (cun 村), filled with art installation and makeshift
structures such as camps, study areas, and supply stations, in which protesters
pressed on for a genuine universal suffrage. Nevertheless, although the move-
ment amplified protesters’ democratic yearnings and will likely give rise to a
more politically active populace, it has raised at least two issues that will con-
tinue to be controversial and divisive, especially in light of the absence of any
concessions from the Hong Kong government or Beijing. 
Two conceptions of the rule of law 
One of the most contentious issues during the movement concerns the
city’s long-cherished rule of law. From the beginning, government officials
and the pro-establishment camps had gone all out to undermine the legiti-
macy of the Occupy Central movement, condemning it as unlawful, detri-
mental to the rule of law, and disruptive to social order. Chief Executive C.Y.
Leung, for example, attacked the movement as an unlawful action to coerce
the central and Hong Kong governments by paralysing core areas of the city,
saying that the government had no right to require the NPC to retract the
August decision. (13) Beijing took a similar line. As soon as protesters occupied
the streets, the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office said that
the central government firmly opposed all illegal activities that could under-
mine the rule of law and jeopardise social order, a message that would be-
come the official framing of the Occupy protests in the mainland press. (14) A
People’s Daily front-page editorial on 1 October argued that the Occupy
protests were illegal and hurting Hong Kong’s rule of law, warning of “unimag-
inable consequences” if the protests continued and stressing that Beijing
stance on Hong Kong’s elections was “unshakable” and legally valid. (15)
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7. Benny Tai, “Gongmin kangming de zuida shashangli wuqi” (The most destructive weapon of civil
disobedience), Hong Kong Economic Journal, 16 January 2013; Melody Chan, “Yifa dayi: gongmin
kangming de zhadan – zhuanfang Dai Yaoting” (Justice through law: The bomb of civil disobedience
– an interview with Benny Tai), Independent Media, 22 January 2013, available at http://www.in-
mediahk.net/node/1015347.
8. Karita Kan, “Occupy Central and Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong,” China Perspectives, 2013/3,
pp. 73-78. 
9. Ibid. 
10. “Full text of NPC decision on universal suffrage for HKSAR chief selection,” Xinhua, 31 August
2014. 
11. Jeffie Lam and Clifford Lo, “Occupy Central leader drops ‘grand banquet’ hint that protest will start
October 1,” SCMP, 24 September 2014. 
12. Gary Tang Kin-yat, “Shei dongyuan qunzhong” (Who mobilised the mass?), Ming Pao, 27 Novem-
ber 2014. 
13. Gary Cheung, Shirley Zhao, and Adrian Wan, “Hong Kong government resolutely opposed to Oc-
cupy Central, says chief executive CY Leung,” SCMP, 29 September 2014. 
14. Ibid. 
15. “Zhenxi lianghao fazhan jumian, weihu Xianggang fanrong wending” (Cherish the good develop-
ment prospect, defend Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability), People’s Daily, 1 October 2014. 
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Other reports and editorials in the Chinese media have weighed in on the
movement, comparing the Occupy protests to the Colour Revolutions with
interference from foreign forces, calling protesters “radical activists,” and
even accusing them of plotting an independence movement. While there
was a heated debate among analysts on how Beijing actually characterised
(dingxing 定性) the protests, Beijing’s official stance seemed to focus on
the illegal nature of the movement and its erosion of the rule of law. The
emphasis on the illegality of the Occupy protest also became an opportu-
nity for Beijing to showcase its national agenda to promote “ruling the
country according to law” (yifa zhiguo 依法治國), a major theme under Xi
Jinping’s administration. (16)
Indeed, there is a legal basis for regarding Occupy Central as unlawful. Or-
ganisers of OCLP have pointed out that participants of Occupy Central could
be guilty of “obstructing, inconveniencing or endangering a person or vehicle
in a public place” under the Summary Offenses Ordinance. (17) In addition,
by blocking roads, the Occupy protests could be considered unauthorised
or unlawful assembly under the Public Order Ordinance. Participants could
be charged with taking part in or organising an “unauthorised assembly” if
it is a meeting of more than 50 persons, which has not been granted a Letter
of No Objection from the Commissioner of Police. Even if the Occupy
protest had received permission from the police, participants could still be
charged with “unlawful assembly” if three or more people assemble “in a
disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner” or provoke other
people to “commit a breach of the peace” – or if police judge that a breach
of the peace is likely to occur. (18)
For leaders of OCLP, however, breaking the law is an essential part of the
civil disobedience movement and is crucial for amplifying protesters’ call
for democracy. In an earlier book, Benny Tai proposed a rule of law pyramid
that explains his vision of the rule of law with four ascending levels of
progress: (1) existence of law, (2) regulation by law, (3) limitation by law,
and (4) justice through law. (19) For Tai, while the first two levels guarantee
that people obey the law, it is justice through law (yifa dayi 以法達義),
which lies at the top echelon, that achieves different conceptions of justice
using the law – including procedural justice, civil rights justice, social justice,
and deliberative justice. However, if the law fails to deliver justice or en-
trenches injustice, then it is necessary to achieve justice through breaking
the law (weifa dayi 違法達義). (20) As Tai wrote in an op-ed, “If law cannot
resolve the factors that lead to civil disobedience… [then] civil disobedience
is necessary to provide the opportunity to change the content of the
law.” (21)
This does not change the unlawful nature of civil disobedience, Tai added,
which protesters must acknowledge and accept – as was exemplified by a
group of Occupy protesters, including Tai and other OCLP organisers, who
surrendered themselves to the police on December 3. However, despite ac-
knowledging the unlawful nature of their actions, they rejected the view
that civil disobedience has undermined the city’s rule of law. (22) Michael
Davis, a law professor at the University of Hong Kong, explained why the
Occupy protests might have broken the law but not undermined the rule
of law. In his newspaper column, Davis argued: 
It is important here to distinguish between breaking the law and un-
dermining the rule of law. The non-violent protesters have clearly
broken the law by not complying with the Public Order Ordinance
and, further, by not clearing those areas covered by court orders. Both
are purposeful law-breaking in furtherance of a non-violent civil dis-
obedience campaign. We should bear in mind that civil disobedience
by definition involves breaking the law in support of a higher ideal
that is the aim of the civil disobedience campaign. (23)
Davis put forward the view that governments are more likely to harm the
rule of law:
By putting the Standing Committee above the law and redefining
basic human rights guarantees in an unrecognisable manner, the
State Council and the Standing Committee have put Hong Kong’s
high degree of autonomy and rule of law in jeopardy. The failure of
the local government to guard Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy
and its seemingly complicit role in the Standing Committee’s deci-
sion implicates it as well. (24)
Davis’ view that breaking the law does not necessarily undermine the rule
of law was supported by other legal scholars who were sympathetic to the
movement. (25) But the Hong Kong Bar Association appeared to disagree. As
the High Court granted civil injunctions to several private groups ordering
protesters to clear sections of the occupied roads in late October, the highly
respected barristers’ organisation criticised protesters for calling for an open
defiance of injunctions, contending that such mass disobedience had “over-
stepped the mark.” “When deliberate defiance of a court order is committed
en masse as a combined effort, a direct affront to the Rule of Law will in-
evitably result,” the statement said, adding that “every resident – from those
filled with the most noble ideas to those seeking only the most menial ad-
vantage – are governed by and bound to the operation of the law.” (26)
Critics, however, questioned the attempt to use the courts to resolve po-
litical issues. One op-ed contributor wrote that “the movement is a
social/political issue requiring a social/political solution, instead of pretend-
ing it is a law-and-order issue to be solved by the police, or a rule-of-law
issue to be solved by the law courts.” (27) Mr. Justice Henry Litton, a non-
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16. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding”
(CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing
Governance According to Law), 4th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, 23 October 2014, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-
10/28/c_1113015330.htm.
17. “OCLP - Manual of Disobedience,” http://oclp.hk/?route=occupy/eng_detail&eng_id=28. 
18. For CAP 245 Public Order Ordinance, see http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799
165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/14B03C325D4C1827482575EE0052311E?OpenDocu-
ment&bt=0. 
19. Benny Tai, Fazhixin: chaoyue tiaowen yu zhidu de falü jiazhi (Passion for Rule of Law: Values beyond
Legal Text and Legal Institutions), Hong Kong Educational Publishing Co, 2012; for the book sum-
mary, see http://roleprojecthku.blogspot.hk/2012/12/rule-of-law-pyramid-by-associate.html.
20. Benny Tai, “Fansi gongmin kangming yu fazhi” (Reflecting on civil disobedience and the rule of
law), Ming Pao, 12 November 2014. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ernest Kao and Joyce Ng, “Benny Tai says Occupy Central has not undermined Hong Kong’s rule
of law,” SCMP, 12 November 2014. 
23. Michael Davis, “Occupy protests breaking law, but not undermining Hong Kong’s rule of law,”
SCMP, 7 November 2014.
24. Ibid. 
25. “No proof Occupy denting rule of law, for now: Albert Chen,” EJ Insight, 29 October 2014; “Occupy
Central will not undermine rule of law: HKU law dean,” EJ Insight, 21 July 2014. 
26. Statement of Hong Kong Bar Association in respect of “Mass Defiance of Court Orders,” Hong
Kong Bar Association, 28 October 2014, available at http://hkba.org/whatsnew/misc/
20141028%20-%20Statement%20of%20Hong%20Kong%20Bar%20Association%20Relat-
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27. Stephanie Cheung, “Hong Kong needs a political solution, not a legal one, to Occupy protests,”
SCMP, 14 November 2014.
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permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal, questioned the “curious” han-
dling of applications for injunctions to clear the Occupy site in Mong Kok,
describing it as a civil court process invoked for what he felt was a public
order issue. (28) But the question was dismissed by Secretary for Justice Rim-
sky Yuen Kwok-keung, who insisted that the government has no intention
of using the courts to resolve political problems. (29) Yuen’s view was largely
in line with the Hong Kong Bar Association, which considered the court in-
junctions to be a purely civil matter. “The court has to be involved […] be-
cause the rights of private citizens protected by the law are said to be
threatened and they seek redress,” its 28 October statement said. (30)
This brings out two conceptions of the rule of law at odds with each other.
For critics of the Occupy movement, rule of law is closer to rule by law.
Under such a conception, the law must be obeyed under all circumstances,
and a breach of the legal code will harm the rule of law. For supporters, the
rule of law is more than just the absolute obedience to law. Rather, the law
can be challenged through civil disobedience, that is, by breaking unjust
laws while bearing the legal consequences. Nevertheless, these conflicting
views eventually came to an abrupt end as the police cleared the last
protest site in Causeway Bay on 15 December. Chief Executive C.Y. Leung
declared the “illegal occupation” over and urged Hong Kong to pursue
“democracy with the rule of law” – but the debate on the legality of the
Occupy protest and the rule of law remained unresolved. 
Mainland-Hong Kong constitutional
relations
A less debated but equally important issue concerns the impact of the
Occupy protest on “One Country, Two Systems” and the future relations
between Hong Kong and mainland China. The key question is whether the
movement will result in Beijing’s tighter grip on the semi-autonomous re-
gion and whether it will be more difficult for Hong Kong to achieve a greater
degree of democracy. Analysts have quoted sources saying that China’s state
security officials beefed up their presence in Hong Kong because of the
protests. (31) Others have raised concerns over Beijing’s possible steps to as-
sert greater control in Hong Kong, such as by increasing surveillance, influ-
encing the media, building stronger united front networks, and swaying
appointments of officials and academics. (32) Most recently, in response to
Britain’s inquiry into the 30-year-old Sino-British Joint Declaration, Beijing
claimed that Britain has neither a role in the 50-year pledge to keep Hong
Kong’s way of life intact nor a moral duty towards Hong Kong. (33)
China’s tightening grip on Hong Kong is congruent with its recent policy
in the SAR, as fully revealed by a White Paper published by the State Council
in June 2014, which defined the city’s high degree of autonomy as “the
power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership.” (34) For
Beijing, the fundamental concern for granting genuine universal suffrage
over which the central government has no or little control is the potential
threat it poses to China, given the region’s proximity to and influence on
the mainland. A fully democratic Hong Kong where Hong Kongers freely
elect their leaders and lawmakers would erode Beijing’s sovereignty over
the region and threaten the rule of the Communist Party by “turning the
city into a base and the bridgehead to subvert the Mainland’s socialist sys-
tem” where “foreign forces” (waiguo shili 外國勢力) could meddle, in the
words of one senior Chinese official. (35) Above all, in the absence of an anti-
secession law, a yet unfulfilled requirement stipulated by Article 23 of the
Basic Law, the introduction of complete democracy in the region could – in
Beijing’s perspective – make China’s national security vulnerable. Hence,
the future Chief Executive must be trusted by the central government, and
for that to happen, there must be a screening mechanism to ensure that
candidates who oppose Beijing will not be elected. (36)
As local international relations scholar Simon Shen Xu-hui interpreted
from a realist’s perspective, the issue at stake is no longer universal suffrage
but an inherent conflict in the principle of “One Country, Two Systems.” (37)
Shen’s view is that Beijing considers local matters in Hong Kong, including
its elections, under a broad conception of “national interest” (guojia liyi 國
家利益), which could be redefined to suit the needs of the central govern-
ment. By contrast, Hong Kong people see “One Country, Two Systems” as a
guarantee of their high degree of autonomy, according to which they could
run local affairs without intervention from Beijing – including the election
of their Chief Executives. Under the rule of Xi Jinping, however, Hong Kong
affairs are regarded as an integral part of national security, placed under the
remit of the newly established National Security Commission (guojia an-
quan weiyuanhui 國家安全委員會). Given the escalating tensions between
Beijing and Hong Kong’s pro-democracy camp, Shen believes there is little
room to reconcile their conflicting views on “One Country, Two Systems.”
The Occupy protest presented a rare opportunity for Beijing to “lure the
snake from its hole” (yinshe chudong 引蛇出洞) (i.e., to identify people who
oppose the Party) and gauge the commitment of its loyalists. This may have
been reflected in the immediate expulsion of James Tien from the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference after his high-profile call for C.Y.
Leung to consider resigning as Chief Executive. (38) Shen argued that Beijing’s
main concern is no longer the electoral method of the 2017 CE election,
but a comprehensive overhaul of its administrative, political, and economic
structure (chongzu Xianggang quanli jiegou 重組香港權力結構).  The di-
chotomous divide created by the Occupy movement in Hong Kong society
will likely aggravate social tensions and provide favourable conditions for
Beijing to strengthen divide-and-rule. (39) Even in the worst-case scenario of
Hong Kong descending into chaos, Beijing will not offer any concessions
but will be justified in acting with greater force. In a similar line of reasoning,
Beijing loyalist Jasper Tsang Yok-sing argued that in light of Beijing’s tough-
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ening stance, it would be more judicious to accept the current electoral re-
form package, as the maintenance of “One Country, Two Systems” hinges
on Beijing’s trust in the Hong Kong populace. A more confrontational atti-
tude, he warned, would result in tighter controls from the central govern-
ment, thus hampering the democratic prospects of the region. (40)
While it is not clear the extent to which Beijing could reshuffle Hong
Kong’s political structure or the process it would take, other observers ap-
peared to be more optimistic, contending that the Occupy movement has
given rise to a more robust civil society. In a newspaper interview reviewing
the 79-day occupation, Benny Tai said that he believed the campaign had
widened the support base of the pro-democracy camp. Even though “more
people became anti-Occupy [towards the end] because they found it went
on too long,” Tai cited a Chinese University poll showing that supporters of
Occupy accounted for more than 30% of respondents, which he believed
was “solid growth” from when he first floated the idea of Occupy Central. (41)
Dr. Chan Kin-man, a sociologist and co-organizer of OCLP, said that even
though the Occupy movement had achieved nothing on institutional
change, it had scored exceptionally well in terms of strengthening civil so-
ciety and enlightening Hong Kong people to fight for democracy. (42) For
cultural commentator An Tu, the Occupy movement represents the triumph
of a self-organised (zifa zhuyi 自發主義) protest movement with decen-
tralised, bottom-up leadership, and is likely to accumulate and transform
into stronger civil society forces. (43) On the other hand, sociologist Hung
Ho-fung refused to consider the “political awakening” set off by the move-
ment as a “partial success” (jieduanxing shengli 階段性勝利) , (44) but argued
that it has catalysed a paradigm shift in the city’s democracy movement
and the making of an autonomous civil society (zizhu gongmin shehui 自
主公民社會). (45)
These positive civil society accounts, however, might overstate reality
given the internal strife between the radical and moderate protesters
throughout and after the Occupy movement, which might result in a more
fragmented pro-democracy camp in the post-Occupy era. (46) But even so,
a fragmented (but active) civil society could bring more clashes with Beijing
under its hardened stance on Hong Kong. In addition, although the true im-
pact of the Occupy movement will take time to emerge, it is certain that
the lack of concessions from the Hong Kong government and Beijing, added
to the unproductive government-protester talks on October 21, (47) will
deepen mistrust between power-holders and the city’s pro-democracy
politicians and supporters. (48) Moreover, the uncompromising approach is
likely to squeeze out any remaining hopes for dialogue and negotiation,
leaving street protests or more radical actions as the only options to express
dissent. The “shopping tour” (Cant.: gau wu tyun 鳩嗚團) (49) protests, char-
acterised by their fluid, spontaneous, leaderless, and quotidian nature, where
protesters rallied for democracy on the pretext of shopping, have offered a
hint of the emerging forms of political activism in post-Occupy Hong
Kong. (50) With tightening control from Beijing and a more active (and
volatile) civil society, Hong Kong is set to enter a new protest era, with the
ambiguities of “One Country, Two Systems” continuing to fuel the tug-of-
war between the Chinese authorities and the Hong Kong pro-democracy
activists. 
Conclusion
Despite the uncertain impact of the Occupy movement, the 79-day oc-
cupation has significantly transformed Hong Kong politics. Not only will
the Hong Kong populace – especially the younger generation – become
more politically active, they will also adopt novel, and more radical, means
of protest to reiterate demands for universal suffrage and to push for greater
autonomy. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Umbrella Move-
ment did not resolve the problems that contributed to its emergence in the
first place; on many levels, as is shown by this article through the debate
on the rule of law and Hong Kong’s constitutional relations with China, the
movement has deepened the social rift, leaving the city with a more frag-
mented and divided society and less room for compromise over disagree-
ments. In combination, these factors will likely give rise to more complex
and confrontational state-society relations in the post-Occupy era. 
“It’s just the beginning,” read a large yellow banner hung by protesters
hours before the Admiralty protest camps were cleared. Indeed, the begin-
ning of an uncertain future as well.
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